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Abstract
In this paper I critically evaluate the value neutrality thesis regarding technology, and find it wanting. I then introduce the 
various ways in which artifacts can come to influence moral value, and our evaluation of moral situations and actions. Here, 
following van de Poel and Kroes, I introduce the idea of value sensitive design. Specifically, I show how by virtue of their 
designed properties, artifacts may come to embody values. Such accounts, however, have several shortcomings. In agree-
ment with Michael Klenk, I raise epistemic and metaphysical issues with respect to designed properties embodying value. 
The concept of an affordance, borrowed from ecological psychology, provides a more philosophically fruitful grounding 
to the potential way(s) in which artifacts might embody values. This is due to the way in which it incorporates key insights 
from perception more generally, and how we go about determining possibilities for action in our environment specifically. 
The affordance account as it is presented by Klenk, however, is insufficient. I therefore argue that we understand affordances 
based on whether they are meaningful, and, secondly, that we grade them based on their force.
Keywords Affordances · Value embedding in artifacts · Value sensitive design
1 Introduction
A key question that emerges in the philosophy of technology 
is whether technological artifacts can embody values. It is a 
truism at this point that technology is value-laden (van den 
Hoven and Weckert 2008), that is, technology can in some 
sense be causally efficacious in the kinds of things we come 
to value (i.e., as means to our ends, as having instrumental 
value). A far more pertinent question, however, concerns the 
status of these artifacts themselves: is it possible for these 
technological artifacts to embody values (Johnson and Noor-
man 2014; van de Poel and Kroes 2014; Klenk 2020)? Can 
artifacts, independently of their use, be said to have value? 
This is one of the more controversial questions in philosophy 
of technology, and it is the question I will concern myself 
with in this paper. “Value”, however, is a diverse concept, 
with many competing accounts of what exactly it is, and, 
moreover, what kinds of value we might be talking about 
(epistemic, moral, etc.). In this paper I will be concerned 
with moral values specifically, and whether it might be pos-
sible to embed such values into technological artifacts.
Consider the case of the American National Rifle Asso-
ciation (NRA), whose opponents advocate against the pro-
liferation of firearms and claim that “Guns kill people”. The 
popular retort from the NRA, captured in their slogan, is that 
“Guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” Implicit in this 
response is the neutrality thesis regarding technology: the 
gun itself does not carry any value and is only instrumentally 
valuable. Its value is determined by its use by human beings, 
and this type of response denies that the technology itself 
embodies any values (Peterson and Spahn 2011). Implicit 
in the first slogan (“Guns kill”) is the view that the material 
components of the gun are irreducible to the social quali-
ties associated with the user-of-the-gun (Latour 1999: 176). 
Some material components of the gun, therefore, can come 
to embody values independently of the qualities of the user. 
In this way an ordinary citizen, by virtue of using a gun, 
can become a threat to society and themselves. The second 
slogan (“Guns don’t kill, people kill”), however, seems to 
suggest that it is not the material components of the gun 
(its design, or whatever) that make it dangerous. The gun is 
simply a neutral carrier of intentions, and those intentions 
naturally flow from the person who is using the gun. If the 
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user-of-the-gun is a good person, the gun will be used with 
discretion and in morally appropriate ways. Conversely, if 
the user is insane or morally bankrupt, the gun will be used 
in morally reprehensible ways: all this, without any change 
in the constitution of the gun itself. Latour considers the first 
slogan to involve a sociological interpretation of artifacts, 
and the second to offer us a material interpretation thereof 
(Latour 1999: 177). The “material” interpretation, following 
Latour, “make[s] the intriguing suggestion that our qualities 
as subjects, our competences, our personalities, depend on 
what we hold in our hands” (Latour 1999: 177). The “socio-
logical” interpretation, in contrast, moralizes the situation. 
Here it is worth quoting Latour at length:
“For the NRA, one’s moral state is a Platonic essence: 
one is born either a good citizen or a criminal. Period. 
As such, the NRA account is moralist-what matters is 
what you are, not what you have. The sole contribution 
of the gun is to speed the act. Killing by fists or knives 
is simply slower, dirtier, messier. With a gun, one kills 
better, but at no point does the gun modify one’s goal” 
(Latour 1999: 177).
The suggestion here (from the NRA at least) is that if we 
can learn to simply be better persons, then we do not have to 
worry about the moral effects of artifacts. If we are trained, 
for example, to uphold better gun safety standards, etc. then 
we would have done all we can. The above characterization 
between “material” and “sociological” interpretations is of 
course a rough caricature of the actual positions held and 
defended by various philosophers of technology. For exam-
ple, nobody would claim that the gun makes no contribution 
to the killing, and nobody would claim that the gun is wholly 
responsible either. Those who oppose the proliferation of 
guns merely assert that these artifacts can affect those who 
make use of them. Conversely, gun control opponents merely 
claim that guns are but one efficient way of carrying out an 
act, with other things also capable of performing the same 
task (Latour 1999: 176; Verbeek 2005: 155). This carica-
ture, however, serves the purpose of introducing the topic of 
value-embedded in technology. In what follows I will briefly 
introduce and then critique the so called “neutrality thesis” 
regarding technological artifacts (Illies and Meijers  2009; 
Peterson and Spahn 2011).
1.1  The neutrality thesis
The Neutrality Thesis states that the various technological 
artifacts are merely neutral means with which agents achieve 
their ends (Illies and Meijers 2009: 421). This view has little 
support in this crude formulation due to the society-wide 
effects that technological artifacts have. Let us call this the 
Strong Neutrality Thesis (SNT). A more sophisticated ver-
sion of the value neutrality of technology is due to Peterson 
and Spahn (2011). Here, the authors show how it is implau-
sible that technology never affects the moral evaluation of 
action (2011: 423). They call this view the weak neutral-
ity thesis (WNT). To make their point salient, they use the 
example of a terrorist.
“who intends to kill ten million people in a big city 
by blowing up a small atomic bomb hidden in a suit-
case. Compare the possible world in which the terrorist 
presses the red button on his suitcase and the bomb 
goes off, with the possible world in which he presses 
the red button on the suitcase but in which nothing 
happens because there was actually no bomb hidden 
in the suitcase. In the first example ten million people 
die, but in the second no one is hurt” (Peterson and 
Spahn (2011: 423).
In the example above, in the first case, the action of 
pushing the button is morally wrong. This, however, is not 
necessarily true of the second case. The point is that the 
mere presence of the bomb in the suitcase changes the moral 
evaluation of the action (Peterson and Spahn 2011: 423, my 
emphasis). In the case where millions die, we are outraged 
and might demand reparations. In the case where nobody 
dies, we might be outraged but it would make little sense 
to seek reparations. Thus the moral valence of the action 
changes, without necessarily changing the fact that in both 
cases an immoral act was committed. At the very least, 
therefore, technology can come to influence consequences, 
and our moral evaluation of those consequences. But can 
technology come to influence what we value?
1.2  Artifacts influencing value
Consider a seemingly trivial example, borrowed from Ver-
beek (2005: 5) of microwave ovens. Initially the microwave, 
as a novel technology, was targeted primarily at men. It 
was marketed as technologically sophisticated device and 
appeared alongside video recorders in stores. Once this mar-
ket became saturated, however, the microwave was marketed 
more as an ordinary cooking device, and started appearing 
alongside refrigerators and ovens (Verbeek 2005: 5). There 
was.
“a gender divide whereby ‘brown goods’ such as tel-
evisions, video and hi-fi were seen as high-tech and 
male-oriented by the company engineers, marketers 
and retailers, while ‘white goods’ such as refrigerators, 
dishwashers and clothes washing machines were seen 
as low-tech and female oriented” (Henry and Powell 
2017: 35).
Early designs of the microwave positioned it as a stereo-
typically ‘brown good’, appealing to single men who did 
not have wives at home to prepare their meals for them in 
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advance (Cockburn 1997). However, after failing to sell, 
retailers reconsidered their options and decided to label the 
microwave as a ‘white good’ and market it to woman. This 
involved, among other things, a change in colour scheme 
(from dark to light) (Henry and Powell 2017: 36). Moreover, 
the microwave made possible a new kind of meal: the frozen 
meal for one, which can be quickly prepared with minimal 
fuss. Before the microwave, there existed few options for 
quickly preparing frozen meals, but with this new technol-
ogy it became easy. This ease made dining alone a far more 
convenient event than it was before. In this way, the micro-
wave can be said to have altered the possible ways we can 
take meals. Subsequently, this change in our available action 
scheme makes us value certain actions more (eating alone) 
than would have been possible without the technological 
artifact being present (Illies and Meijers 2009: 422).
“Thus technologies are not understood as neutral (a 
mere addition to a pre-given social system), or deter-
minative (directly causal of changes in a social system) 
but as an embedded and co-constituting feature of soci-
ety and its structures, cultures and practices” (Henry 
and Powell 2017: 36–37).
In this sense, technological artifacts are not simple “inter-
mediaries”, but rather mediators, in the relation between 
humans and the world (Verbeek 2005: 114). They change 
how the world appears to us and our possible interactions 
with it. In this way, technology, broadly construed, can come 
to influence what we value, and increase the likelihood of 
certain states of affairs coming about. In what follows I will 
outline how technological artifacts can influence moral 
values.
1.3  Artifacts influencing moral values
Let us start with an examination of “Killer robots”—weapon 
systems capable of performing lethal military operations that 
were once the domain of human beings. An example of this 
type of system is the “Predator”1 drone, an unpiloted combat 
aerial vehicle capable of remotely performing military oper-
ations such as air-to-ground missile launches (Sparrow 2007: 
63; Royakkers and van Est 2015: 560).Talk of drone technol-
ogy has recently become part of our common lexicon, with 
former US president Barrack Obama’s controversial use of 
drones to wage war in Iraq being a key trigger point for this 
debate. Moreover, the addition of Distinguished Warfare 
Medals for drone operators has also drawn the public’s atten-
tion. Such awards can outrank combat medals awarded to 
US troops, and the public’s uncertainty as to whether drone 
pilots deserve to be acknowledged in this way is suggestive 
of the lack of consensus with regards to done warfare and its 
place in the military (Sparrow 2015: 380).
Consider an example from the Kosovo war, in which 
NATO aircraft were forced to fly above 15,000 feet to avoid 
enemy fire. In this case, any bombs deployed would have had 
to be dropped from this height. In one instance, this tragi-
cally resulted in NATO aircraft mistaking a convoy of busses 
transporting refugees for Serbian tanks, and subsequently 
bombing them (Royakkers and van Est 2015: 560). In such a 
situation, an unpiloted drone would be preferred, as it could 
fly at a lower altitude, taking greater care in target selec-
tion and the subsequent use of lethal force. Such drones also 
reduce the need for human lives to be put in danger in mili-
tary operations, creating a new class of ‘cubicle warriors’ 
(ibid.: 560). They also may be cheaper than human soldiers 
in the long run (a military drone does not need a pension 
scheme or a hospital plan), and outperform human soldiers 
in specific domains (human soldiers tend to require sleep to 
function optimally) (Müller 2014: 4). There is, therefore, a 
strong prima facie case for driving the project to create ever 
more complex drone technology, and this is indeed reflected 
in the US government having funded research into the con-
struction of autonomous robots since the early 2000’s via 
the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
(Wallach and Allen 2009: 49).2 One could even argue that 
it would be morally impermissible to place a soldier in a 
life-threatening situation if that same task could be carried 
out by a military robot, in which case the use of such robots 
could be ethically defensible, and even encouraged.
Armed with this understanding of military drones more 
generally, we can consider a situation in which drones take 
lethal action and civilian casualties are incurred. This is not 
mere speculation: it is estimated that since 2004 between 
769 and 1725 civilians have been killed in drone strikes in 
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan (Drone War-
fare 2019). Moreover, drones are not infallible, and we can 
foresee a scenario in which a decision is made to launch 
a strike, but the target is misidentified (as in the Kosovo 
example above) (Tollon 2019: 20). In such cases it is still 
human beings who are pulling the trigger, albeit from a dis-
tance. Therefore, when evaluating such civilian deaths, we 
should exclusively look towards the human beings that can 
be held morally responsible for these deaths, since holding 
the drone responsible would be conceptually inappropriate. 
This is generally because (i) human operators are taken to be 
ultimately responsible for the actions of such drones, and (ii) 
because moral responsibility is taken to entail punishment, 
1 More recent iterations of this technology include the “Reaper” and 
the “Avenger” drones (Sparrow 2015: 380).
2 The US Department of Defence spends $5 billion per year on 
‘unmanned systems’ (their sexist terminology, not mine), while 
DARPA has an annual budget of $3 billion (Müller 2014: 4).
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and drones cannot be punished (e.g. Sparrow 2007: 74). 
However, notwithstanding the fact that human operators are 
held morally responsible, it is clear the use of such drones 
makes the act of killing far easier.
The history of military technology is such that at each 
new stage of development we get better at killing from a 
distance: from swords to SWORDS (a remotely operated 
machine gun which makes use of the Special Weapons 
Observation Remote Direct-action System) (Wallach and 
Allen 2009: 20). Killing from a distance gets around two 
of the most common barriers to an effective war machine: 
Firstly, soldiers’ fear of being killed, and secondly, their 
resistance to killing others. The fact that machines currently 
lack the capacity for affect is seen as an improvement on 
human soldiers, as it means they (machines) would not have 
these affective limitations.
In the example above, therefore, it is possible to discern a 
distinct change in moral values: in the classic case, soldiers 
are trained to engage with combatants and non-combatants 
in warfare. This is predicated on the fact that soldiers will 
in fact find themselves in situations where they will have 
to make decisions on the fly, without perfect information, 
while simultaneously being in the theatre of war itself, and, 
therefore, factoring in to their decisions the potential con-
sequences of their actions for their own lives. A courageous 
action, in such a scenario, might be risking one’s life to save 
another, as courage involves a personal sacrifice to do what 
is right. Thus (and this is but one example) the virtue of 
being courageous in this sense is valued, and indeed deemed 
morally commendable. By contrast, remotely operated 
drones outsource many of the affective components of war-
fare, meaning that decisions can be made outside the context 
of the theatre of war itself. Specifically, drone operators need 
not be concerned with whether they will live or die when 
performing a given military operation, and so will not fac-
tor this into the decisions they make, as there is no personal 
sacrifice to be made.3 Here the distinction between moral 
and physical courage becomes paramount. Physical courage 
refers to the capacity to face bodily injury (or death), while 
moral courage refers to the capacity to make difficult moral 
decisions (Sparrow 2015: 383). On the surface, it seems as 
though drone operators may not exercise physical courage 
due to their being geographically separated from the theatre 
of war. However, it seems plausible that they could cultivate 
moral courage, as they could of course refuse to follow an 
instruction to kill should they deem it problematic on moral 
grounds, despite whatever institutional pressure there may 
be to follow such a command. However, and this is crucial, 
in the case of military personnel who find themselves “on 
the ground”, moral and physical courage go hand in hand. It 
is by virtue of their proximity to conflict that such soldiers 
are said to act courageously, literally risking their lives for 
what they believe to be right. Their physical courage, in a 
sense, gives rise to moral courage.
This is not to say, however, that drone operators are there-
fore incapable of moral courage. It seems right to me that 
such persons can and do exercise the capacity of moral cour-
age when they refuse orders that may be illegal or immoral. 
However, to my mind, the absence of physical risk matters 
significantly.4 And it is this that constitutes a change in how 
we think about military ethics more generally: in the past, 
courage (at least in the military sense) was understood to 
involve both physical and moral criteria, with the two being 
joined at the hip. Now, however, it is possible to discern a 
change whereby the one can be decoupled from the other. I 
leave it open as to what the exact relationship between moral 
and physical courage may be. My point is simply that our 
usage of such teleoperated weapons has forced us to consider 
a change a change in what constitutes the moral value of 
“courage”, at least in military settings.
1.4  Intentionally designed features as embodying 
value
What I have shown above is that technological artifacts can 
influence what we come to value. Moreover, I showed how 
these artifacts can also change what comes to constitute a 
given moral value. In what follows, however, I would like to 
explore whether such artifacts can have value independently 
of their use. That is, can technological artifacts be “good” or 
“bad” by virtue of their designed properties alone? Should 
this question be answered in the affirmative, it would mean 
a significant burden would be placed on those who design 
such systems. There would need to be serious ethical consid-
erations and extensive consultations around the intended and 
unintended consequences of specific design choices. Moreo-
ver, it would mean aligning the values of our technological 
systems with the values we aim for as a society (How 2017; 
Taddeo and Floridi 2018; Floridi et al. 2020). I will show 
that we should not focus exclusively on the designed proper-
ties of artifacts. First, this kind of approach does not allow 
3 This is not to say that there is no risk to their well-being, however, 
as there are cases where drone operators experience severe PTSD 
from the actions that they are required to perform (Sparrow 2015: 
386).
4 The current usage of drone technology is highly asymmetrical: 
one finds these systems being used by, for example, the US, against 
groups in the Middle East who lack the economic and technological 
capacity to make use of such systems. We can imagine a future, how-
ever, where these groups have access to such technology and can use 
it to target the geographically remote drone control centres. In such a 
scenario, perhaps drone operators would be able to exercise physical 
courage, due to the risks of their occupation.
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values to change, and, second, it encounters the difficulty of 
figuring out what exactly designer intentions may be. From 
this I will introduce an affordance account of technological 
artifacts, which aims to shed light on how technological arti-
facts afford certain uses, and in this way, independently of 
their actual use, can encourage or discourage certain actions.
A good place to start for such a design focussed account is 
provided by van de Poel and Kroes (2014), where the authors 
claim that value sensitive design (VSD) can lead to artifacts 
capable of embodying value (2014: 112). This account turns 
on technical artifacts being intentionally designed to have 
certain features, and that, in some cases at least, these fea-
tures can result in technology embodying value (2014: 112). 
I will outline and then critique their argument.
1.5  The intentional account
Van de Poel and Kroes make use of two contrasting exam-
ples to underscore their thesis: sea dykes and knives. Sea 
dykes, as flood protection embankments, serve the function 
of protecting low-lying land near the sea from flooding. As 
the authors note, the point is not that sea dykes are instru-
mentally valuable (i.e., that they can be used as effective 
vehicles for safety), but rather that safety is an integral part 
of their function (i.e., safety, as a design specification, is 
part of their makeup) (Van de Poel and Kroes 2014: 114). 
Contrast this with a kitchen knife: the function of such a 
knife is to cut things. Such cuttings may be instrumentally 
valuable, for example, for the maintenance of good health 
or well-being, etc. However, and significantly, the realisa-
tion of these final values is not part of the function of knives 
nor are these values to be found in the design specification 
of knives in general (Van de Poel and Kroes 2014: 114). In 
other words, in the case of the knife, its function and the 
final values that can be achieved via this function can be 
separated. This is not the case in the sea dyke example, as 
their instrumental purpose (prevention of flooding) is neces-
sarily tethered to their final value, the value for which they 
are intentionally designed (safety from flooding) (Van de 
Poel and Kroes 2014: 114).
Based on this discussion, the authors go on to claim that:
“the embodiment of extrinsic final values in technical 
artifacts thus depends on both an intentional condition 
(‘x has been designed for G’) and on a condition that 
primarily refers to physical properties (‘The designed 
properties of x have the potential to achieve or contrib-
ute to G (under the appropriate conditions’)” (Van de 
Poel and Kroes 2014: 118).
Thus, their account hinges importantly on the designed 
properties of the artifact in question, as these artifacts can 
only be said to properly embody value if they have been 
intentionally designed as such. However, just because an 
artifact has been intentionally designed to embody a specific 
value, does not mean that it will always realise that value, 
in practice (van de Poel and Kroes 2014: 119). In this way, 
there is a crucial difference between the intended value (that 
which designers aim to embody), embodied value, and the 
realised value of a technical artifact. The embodied value is 
that which is intentionally designed, whereas the realised 
value is how this value comes about in practice or use (van 
de Poel and Kroes 2014: 119). The context in which a tech-
nical artifact is embedded, therefore, plays a crucial role in 
co-determining whether the intended or embedded value is 
indeed realised (van de Poel and Kroes 2014: 119).
In other words, intended design underdetermines the 
value that an artifact may come to be embedded with. There 
are cases where the specific use of a technology in different 
situations leads to the realisation of different values (van de 
Poel and Kroes 2014: 120). In addition to this, the authors 
also point out that VSD is only the first step in the process 
of creating an artifact that properly embodies a relevant 
value. This implies that designers have an obligation to not 
just consider their design intentions, but also the potential 
contexts in which the device will be used, anticipating the 
potential for multiple realisability of values in practice.
1.6  Problems with the value sensitive design 
account
While the argument presented by van de Poel and Kroes 
is significant for the way in which it makes salient how 
technologies can embody values, I will argue below that 
this accout still has some shortcomings. Specifically, I will 
follow Klenk (2020), who argues against van de Poel and 
Kroes by showing that their acocunt has both metaphysical 
and epistemic issues. From this he introduces the concept 
of an afforance, borrowed from ecological psychology, into 
discussions surrounding value embedding in philosophy of 
technology.
1.7  Metaphysical issues
The first issue that Klenk raises is metaphysical, and pertains 
to the intended use versus the designed use of an artifact 
(2020: 5). According to Klenk, IHAVE5 creates a disjuncture 
between actual use and the question of whether an artifact 
embodies a value (2020: 5). This suggests that while the 
designers of artifacts are the source of value for the vari-
ous technical artifacts, it is not necessary for them to also 
sustain those values in practice. An implication of this is 
5 IHAVE is Klenk’s term of art for the intentional history account 
of value embedding, which is how he understands van de Poel and 
Kroes’ argument.
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that how an artifact comes to be used is not a requirement 
when considering what value it embodies. While van de Poel 
and Kroes do acknowledge that designers must consider the 
potential uses of the artifact, this consideration is only appli-
cable insofar as it features in the design phase (2014: 120). 
While the VNT claimed that an artifacts value is only to be 
found in its use, van de Poel and Kroes seem to be claiming 
that use has no bearing whatsover on value (2014). In such 
a scenario, we would always have to look at the designed 
intentions of an artifact to determine its value. It is here 
that the metaphysical issue rears its head: if the value of an 
artificat is “fixed” at its origin, then it does not seem possible 
that the embodied value of an artifact can change over time 
(Klenk 2020: 5).
An implication of this is that should we want to claim that 
the value of an artifact has to change, we would then need to 
claim that the designed intentions also changed. This is of 
course impossible: we cannot go back in time and change the 
intentional history associated with a particular technical arti-
fact (Klenk 2020: 6). The only kind of value change that is 
possible on this account is elimination of value completely. 
Once an artifact stops contributing to the relevant designed 
value, it ceases to have any value whatsoever. There are, 
however, cases of appropriation, where the embedded value 
of the technology is shown to be subject to change, with-
out any change in the artifacts intentional history (Klenk 
2020: 6). We, therefore, have both metaphysical and practi-
cal grounds for questioning the tenability of the intentional 
history account.
Moreover, there is the issue of how designer intentions 
are supposed to feature in technology itself. If it is designer 
intentions that really matter, then what is the use of claim-
ing that technology, embodies value? If we ought to look 
toward designer intentions, then it seems that any value that 
we would find in technology would simply be a derivative of 
those which the designers had in mind. It, therefore, makes 
little sense to speak of technology embodying values at all, 
as the values seem to be in the heads of the designers. This 
leads to certain epistemic issues.
1.8  Epistemic issues
To see the epistemic issues with IHAVE, once again con-
sider the determining role that designed intentions play in 
the value an artifact comes to embody. To fix the value of a 
given artifact, therefore, it should be possible to have reli-
able access to those designed intentions, to ensure that our 
judgment is epistemically sound. There are two possible 
ways in which these intentions can be uncovered: directly 
or indirectly (Klenk 2020: 7). Directly observing intentions 
is impossible,6 and the best we can hope for in this regard is 
an accurate inference. At best, this inference gives us indi-
rect access to intentions.
Indirect access can be obtained in a number of ways. 
First, one could look at the observable features of the artifact 
in question, and reverse engineer what the design intentions 
may have been. However, since design intentions underde-
termine design choices, this route seems fraught with dif-
ficulty (Klenk 2020: 2). Second, designers often make their 
intentions clear, either verbally or through explicit docu-
mentation of the design process. In such cases, we seem 
to have a reliable way to track design intentions, as these 
documents are in some cases publicly accessible (or can at 
least be uncovered upon request). These documents can illu-
minate the designed intentions and how they relate to the 
physical properties of the artifact. Klenk, however, points 
out that we have situations in which the same artifact has 
two different intentional histories associated with it (2020: 
8). This is clearest in cases of replication, and specifically 
replication with the intention for novel usage. It is possible 
to imagine an engineer, E, who designs a specific artifact 
A, recording along the way their designed intentions. Now, 
another engineer, E* comes across A, but intends to use it 
for very different purposes. E* records their design inten-
tions for product A*, which are substantially different from 
those of E. However, the physical properties of A and A* 
are identical, with different intentional histories. In such a 
scenario, we would have to decide which intentions matter 
most, and only then would we be able to determine which 
values the physically identical artifacts have. IHAVE, how-
ever, does not provide us with certainty as to which inten-
tions “count”, creating epistemic uncertainty (Klenk 2020: 
8). Following from these difficulties with IHAVE, Klenk 
argues that we instead investigate an affordance account of 
value embedding in artifacts.
2  The affordance account
Klenk suggests that we look towards the literature on affor-
dances, which finds empirical support in the ecological 
psychology literature, founded by Gibson (1979). Klenk 
claims that artifacts can embody values if they enable val-
uable actions. In other words, artifacts can afford certain 
actions (like a chair affords sitting), and these affordances 
are response-dependant (Klenk 2020: 9). They are response-
dependant in the sense that they make some or other action 
more likely, given the physical properties of the artifact in 
6 Unless of course you are the designer and are observing your own 
intentions. However, in for these intentions to count they should be 
amenable to some kind of third-party verification, and so the first-per-
son perspective is inappropriate for such an inquiry.
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conjunction with the given context (in one scenario a stair-
case may afford walking up, but in another it may afford 
sitting). This also underscores the fact that, should we find 
that the affordance account is successful, it is a relational 
account of value embedding.
As noted above, the concept of an affordance was initially 
used in ecological psychology. Here, it was operationalised 
to show how different environments “offer” various potenti-
alities of action for a given organism. Gibson used the term 
to refer to perceived opportunities to engage with objects in 
the world (1979). The novelty of this account, at the time, 
was its emphasis on the fact that perception is not viewed 
as the passive interpretation of environmental information. 
Rather, perception is to be understood as active and direct, 
in that our activities are goal-directed, and we do not merely 
perceive the world but we also perceive the possibilities for 
action that our world presents to us. This “basic” reading 
of affordances might suggest that they are merely natural 
properties of the world. However, one can easily extend this 
to account for cultural affordances. On this proposal, the 
skilled learning of individual agents, in their given niches, 
can change the possibilities for action in a given affordance 
landscape (Ramstead et al. 2016: 3).
For example, a desk may afford writing, reading, etc. 
for an adult human.7 However, for an animal the same desk 
may afford shelter. Which type of affordance is more sali-
ent depends on the characteristics of the entities in ques-
tion (human, animal, or machine). Given knowledge about 
the entities involved, we can make reasonable inferences as 
to what a given object might afford (such as knowing that 
animals are unlikely to use a desk for writing). In this way 
the affordances an artifact embodies depends both on its 
physical makeup and on the characteristics of the subject. 
Moreover, we can imagine that shared cultural history and 
social learning would also come to play a role in the kinds of 
affordances that agents would find to be most salient (Ram-
stead et al. 2016). For example, for chimpanzees’ rocks may 
afford the cracking of nuts, but for lizards they may only 
afford basking in the sun.
Klenk’s first point is to assuage worries that affordances 
are merely secondary properties of artifacts, and that they 
depend in an important sense on whether they are per-
ceived, desired, sought out, etc. This is important, as if the 
concept is only of secondary importance, it would lend 
credence to the VNT, since the value of an artifact would 
then plausibly be determined by how it is used by subjects. 
However, a response to this argument is to argue that even 
response-dependant properties can in fact be objective 
(Klenk 2020: 14). To see how this is the case consider the 
example of the perception of red, used by Klenk. When we 
claim that.
“something red is defined by looking red to normal 
observers in normal circumstances, then that means 
that in normal circumstances, normal observers will 
experience the object as red. It does not entail, how-
ever, that the thing looking red is what makes the thing 
red” (Klenk 2020: 14).
In this sense, the property of “being red” is an objective 
one and does not necessarily depend on a subject being pre-
sent, nor on it being perceived.
Secondly, Klenk then shows how these response-depend-
ant properties are indeed values (2020: 15). To do this he 
claims that affordances can enable or enhance the chances of 
an action coming about. In this sense they can be understood 
as “helping or encouraging” certain actions, and that these 
are linked to the dispositions of the agent in question (Klenk 
2020: 15). These dispositions can be both instrumentally and 
finally valuable (i.e., valuable in themselves). A disposition 
to be curious is both instrumentally valuable (in that it is 
useful for uncovering certain facts about the world), but also 
seems valuable in itself. Thus, the affordance(s) of an artifact 
are to be conceived of as being part of the set of enabling 
conditions for the use of that artifact. These enabling con-
ditions can be valuable in themselves, and so artifacts, by 
embodying affordances, also embody values (Klenk 2020: 
16). It is here that Klenk’s account comes to an end, but I 
would like to suggest that his argument could be helpfully 
extended by considering meaningful affordances, graded by 
their force. Meaningful affordances are those which solicit 
specific kinds of actions, whereas mere affordances simply 
provide possibilities for actions more generally. In other 
words, I will show that not all affordances are experienced 
or created equally.
2.1  Extending the affordance account
The first thing to note about Klenk’s account is that, while 
he acknowledges that affordances are response-dependant 
properties, he claims that they are nonetheless objective 
properties of artifacts, and hence it seems likely that they 
have a permanent ontological status. However, this kind of 
claim could be challenged: for example, it is clear that a 
glass of water affords drinking. However, whether the act 
of drinking is solicited depends on how thirsty I am. In this 
sense, there are different ways in which we may experience 
the same affordance. This solicitation, critically, depends on 
its relevance to our concerns (Dings 2018: 682). In this way 
the notion of an affordance does not seem to be that objec-
tive kind of property that Klenk argues it to be. However, 
7 This account of affordances shows that when objects afford certain 
actions, they are not acting themselves. Therefore, this account of 
value embedding in technology is silent on whether technology can 
have moral agency.
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I do not think that what I have said above refutes Klenk’s 
argument, as I will show below.
Consider again the claim that what an object affords is 
not necessarily dependant on its perception. I argued above, 
however, that we seem to have reason to doubt this claim, 
as affordances may solicit various responses from subjects, 
based on those subjects’ concerns (such as being thirsty). 
However, this subjective element need not lead us to argue 
that affordances are not objective properties. It seems plau-
sible to say that while, phenomenologically, our concerns 
shape how an object might afford actions, that the object 
affords something does not change, and it is this sense of 
affordance that remains objective (Dings 2018: 684). So 
while my being thirsty determines whether I perform the 
action of drinking water, this does not change the objective 
feature of the glass of water (that it affords drinking). How-
ever, it is here that the question of “force” rears its head. In 
the example above I claimed, following Klenk, that an affor-
dance is indeed an objective property. However, it seems 
clear that, depending on concerns of the perceiving subject, 
the associated strength of the affordance is subject to change. 
I think that this could be a useful conceptual resource to add 
to Klenk’s argument.
2.2  Towards a robust affordance account
I believe that the concept of an affordance can be of great 
aid to researchers in the philosophy of technology. However, 
in order for this to properly come to fruition we need to 
add some nuance to the account developed by Klenk. Spe-
cifically, while affordances are indeed objective properties 
of the world, the perceiving agents phenomenology plays 
a significant role. I believe that Klenk’s account above is 
atomistic in its construal of affordances, and that it would 
benefit from a more holistic interpretation (Dings 2020). 
Such a holistic interpretation acknowledges that agents have 
specific concerns, and that “these concerns are embedded 
in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commit-
ments” (Dings 2020: 1).
Specifically, we require an understanding of affordances 
that helps us explain why certain actions might be made 
more likely than others. As noted, it is not enough to simply 
look at the designed properties of artifacts. We must also 
take seriously the psychology of those who will be using 
these artifacts: human beings. I will offer two extensions 
of Klenk’s account. The first involves an elaboration on the 
“meaningfulness” of an affordance, and the second concerns 
the “force” of an affordance.
2.3  The meaningfulness of an affordance
Firstly, then, we need a means of cashing out the likelihood 
of various possibilities for action. One way to do this would 
be to distinguish between “merely relevant” possibilities 
for action and “meaningful” possibilities for action (Dings 
2020: 2). Meaningful affordances would be those that related 
to, for example, the concerns or values held by the agent in 
question. “Merely relevant” affordances, on the other hand, 
would have a more impoverished associated phenomenol-
ogy. When we consider personal history, values, and self-
narrative (that is, we pay attention to the embedded nature of 
affordances), we can see how these things come to shape the 
possibilities for actions that an agent may perceive.
For example, consider an agent’s personal history. This 
speaks to the role of memory, as for one person “a path” 
might be experienced as a means to get out of a forest. To 
another, however, it might be experienced as the way home, 
which has a far richer associated phenomenology. In the 
example above, the one agent views the path as a “mere” 
affordance, whilst to the other views it as a meaningful 
affordance, and this is due in large part to their values and 
commitments, which are a result of their personal histories 
(which collectively can be called “concerns”) (Dings 2020: 
9). Such concerns are not static: they are a product of a 
multitude of factors and have both forward- and backward-
looking aspects. An agents history shapes who they are at 
any given moment, and their goals also play a role in guiding 
their actions. It is, therefore, important that such agential 
interests are taken into account. Distinguishing between 
meaningful and “mere” affordances can aid us in this task.
Following from this it makes sense to distinguish how 
various kinds of actions might be identified by agents. This 
helps us keep the notion of a meaningful affordance precise, 
while preserving its inherent pluralism. Such a scale would 
move from relatively low-level to high level action identifi-
cation (Dings 2020: 10). At the low end of the scale we find 
affordances that suggest how an action is to be performed 
(for example, a handle that affords gripping). At the high-
end we find affordances that suggest why an action is to be 
performed, and this often involves “specifying the reasons 
or long-term goals that are relevant” (Dings 2020: 11). For 
example, imagine coming across some used cardboard box 
in the street. The box, at a rather low level, might simply 
afford being picked up. However, at a higher level, it might 
afford recycling, being thrown away, etc. These higher-order, 
“why” identifications once again draw our attention to the 
embeddedness of agents concerns, and the effects of this on 
how affordances are experienced.
2.4  The force of an affordance
My second extension of the affordance account has more 
to do with the concept of an affordance itself. I believe that 
it is possible to grade affordances based on their “force”, 
that is, whether they are “demanding” or “inviting” (Dings 
2018: 689). The kinds of technology we produce, based on 
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their design, may be more or less inviting for certain kinds 
of actions. For example, while an AK-47 and a handgun both 
afford the use of lethal force, the AK-47 is more demanding 
in this regard, given that it is explicitly designed to be as 
lethal as possible, whereas a small handgun might be argued 
to be only designed for self-defence. While the notion of a 
meaningful affordance has to do with the concerns of the 
agent in question, the notion of force here concerns the psy-
chological machinery that agents such as ourselves possess, 
and our subsequent interaction with technical artifacts. Here 
it might be possible to draw on work in the behavioural sci-
ences, where cognitive biases are studied in detail (Kahne-
man 2011). A major applied stream of research in this field 
is nudge theory, which is often used in the service of socially 
desirable outcomes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). A key pre-
supposition of this approach is that there are reliable ways 
in which we fail to reason properly about the world due to 
various  constraints (time, information, etc.). In cases such 
as this, successful behavioural interventions can increase 
the likelihood of positive outcomes, without necessarily 
changing the economic incentives of the agent (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008: 8).8 For example, switching to opt-out (as 
opposed to opt-in) retirement plans in the UK resulted in a 
37% increase in eligible private sector worker participation 
(Cribb and Emmerson 2016).
Socially beneficial outcomes, in some cases, can, there-
fore, be seen as kinds of engineering problems that thought-
ful design can help to promote. The inverse, of course, is 
also true. Recommender systems, for example, might sug-
gest problematic content to users (Burr et al. 2018; Alfano 
et al. 2020). The affordance account introduced in this paper, 
and the specific notion of “force”, allows us to better under-
stand these and other issues by giving us a framework with 
which to evaluate how and why certain probabilities for 
action might be increased or decreased. To do so requires 
us to take seriously our cognitive biases and ensure our arti-
facts our designed appropriately. Examples of these biases 
include the primacy bias, availability bias, and priming bias 
(see Kahneman 2011).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into each 
of these biases in detail, they do reveal something interest-
ing regarding affordances: their dual-nature. Affordances are 
both descriptive and prescriptive. They are descriptive in the 
sense in which “they constitute the privileged mode for the 
perceptual disclosure of aspects of the environment” (Ram-
stead et al. 2016: 5). That is, they help us describe aspects of 
the environment that may be perceived. They are prescrip-
tive in that “they specify the kinds of action and perception 
that are available, situationally appropriate and, in the case 
of social niches, expected by others” (Ramstead et al. 2016: 
5). In this prescriptive sense, then, affordances the help track 
what kinds of actions would be appropriate or expected from 
particular agents. Considering the gun example introduced 
earlier, the AK-47 and the hand can both be descriptively 
understood as affording “lethal force”. Prescriptively, how-
ever, the force with which the AK-47 solicits this action is 
far greater, given the range and kinds of actions it invites.
3  Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued against the Neutrality Thesis 
regarding technology. I then introduced a value embedding 
account of technology, which was shown to have metaphysi-
cal and epistemic shortcomings. Following Klenk (2020), I 
argued for an affordance-based account of value embedding. 
I further argued that such an account could be extended in 
fruitful ways, especially if they take into account the force 
of the affordance in question. This creates the interesting 
situation in which our design of technological artifacts is not 
the determining factor in the kinds of values they come to 
embody. Rather, there is always a dance between designed 
properties and the way in which we perceive them. This 
brings in to sharper focus how the affordance account of 
value embedding might be used in practice, and how we 
might be able to more reliably cash out the values embedded 
in our technologies.
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